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 Abstract 
A study of equilibrium acreage allocation decisions at the farm and regional levels under 
risk aversion, yield uncertainty, and endogenous crop prices is undertaken in a two-crop, 
two-region setting. The main insight is that a partial specialization in one crop at a regional 
level may be an equilibrium dominant strategy relative to the more diversified crop mix 
produced on farm. This is due to the trade-offs among the effects of the “natural hedge” 
based on the negative price-yield correlation on the probability distributions of crop revenues 
and whole-farm revenue risk reduction through crop enterprise diversification. Another 
finding is that equilibrium in which each region grows only one crop is unlikely unless there 
are comparative advantages in production (or marketing) across regions. Other circumstances 
under which complete regional specialization is possible include a high level of producer risk 
aversion along with limited benefits derived through crop enterprise diversification due to 
high correlation of farm-level yields for different crops, and a low crop price elasticity. This 
applies to situations in which one can identify growing regions that are possessed of two 
features. The first feature is that growing conditions are relatively homogenous and farm-
level yield co-variability is higher within each region as compared with that across the 
regions. The second feature is that the sizes of the regions are large enough to have a 
substantial impact on output prices.  
 
Keywords: land allocation, spatial yield dependence, supermodular order. 
 
  
SPATIAL PRODUCTION CONCENTRATION UNDER  
YIELD RISK AND RISK AVERSION 
 
Introduction 
In recent years, agricultural market analysts have increasingly paid more attention to the 
spatial concentration of production in both animal and crop agriculture. In particular, the 
geographic concentration of production of main field crops in several growing regions is a 
distinctive feature of the U.S. agricultural landscape. Geographic production patterns are 
shaped by a host of factors, including soil qualities, proximity to input and output markets, 
vertical coordination, farm size, and marketing environment. Here the focus is on another 
essential feature of the grower’s decision environment: price and yield uncertainty and spatial 
yield co-variability. 
The goal of this paper is to investigate circumstances under which regional specialization 
in a small number of crops substitutes for farm-level diversification among multiple crops as a 
risk management strategy when most of the price risk is attributed to output risk. It has long 
been observed that there exists a negative price-yield correlation when production is concen-
trated in one geographical area (Harwood et al. 1999; Hart 2003).1 This seems to provide a 
“natural hedge” that insures producers against low revenues due to low yields given that 
individual yields are correlated with the national yield. Because of common soil conditions and 
weather patterns, the correlation among crop yields is typically higher when production is 
geographically concentrated in one area. This implies that for producers in a region where a 
small number of crops are produced, growing multiple crops may be an inferior risk diversifi-
cation strategy. Introducing other sources of risk may increase the overall farm exposure 
compared with specializing in a few crops when the individual output is highly correlated with 
the total supply. However, the expected revenue for the crops with little correlation between 
price and producer-specific yield is also higher, keeping everything else equal. 
And so, depending on the spatial pattern of crop production in the area, there appears to 
be two distinct approaches to managing risks through acreage allocation.2 In a region with 
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multiple crops and dispersed production, growing multiple crops is likely preferred to 
specializing in one crop because whole-farm revenue risk is subdivided among several 
relatively independent risks. However, in a region where a small number of crops are grown, 
there may be enough built-in “natural insurance,” and producers may prefer to face the one 
“insured” source of risk as opposed to multiple but relatively “uninsured” (from the pro-
ducer’s point of view) risks. In a two-crop setting, the trade-offs between these revenue risk 
management strategies and the resultant inter-regional cropland allocation are analyzed.3 
This paper contributes to the literature on land allocation under uncertainty (e.g., Collen-
der and Zilberman 1985) in two respects. First, the crop revenue risk is endogenously 
determined by both producer-specific and aggregate yield risks in a general equilibrium 
framework. Second, the spatial yield dependence structure is explicitly modeled in a setting 
with two crops and two regions in a transparent, albeit somewhat rudimentary, way. This 
study draws on the standard insights from the literature on optimal portfolio selection (e.g., 
Hadar and Seo 1990; Meyer and Ormiston 1994; Gollier 2001) in order to inquire into the 
effects of spatial yield dependence on cropland allocation decisions. The concern here is not 
with the comparative statics properties but rather with the interaction of the optimal land 
allocation by risk-averse producers dispersed across two regions and the aggregate yield risk. 
The study inspects the plausibility of the hypothesis that the observed distribution of crop 
production across geographical areas has, at least in part, a risk management leitmotiv. And 
so, the nature of crop revenue risk endogeneity modeled in this paper is not due to the input 
adjustment under general stochastic production technology studied by Chambers and Quiggin 
(2001) but rather is due to the aggregation of individual yields at the market level.4 While the 
endogeneity in the amount of risk one is willing to accept has received much attention in the 
portfolio selection, self-insurance, and self-protection literatures, the focus here is on the 
endogeneity of price uncertainty as a result of the inter-regional cropland allocation and its 
impact on the producer-specific revenue risks. 
To analyze the equilibrium level of regional specialization in one crop, the production 
and demand environments are restricted to attain symmetry across both crops and regions.  
This rules out any motives for asymmetric land allocation across regions stemming from 
comparative advantages in crop production or marketing, and allows us to focus on the 
effects of yield risk aggregation and inter-regional cropland distribution.  The imposed 
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symmetry assures that crop revenues, given appropriate acreage allocation, have identical 
probability distributions, which is parallel to the standard assumption of ex-ante identical and 
independent assets used in the analysis of the investment portfolio selection problem.  
Environments in which regions may partially specialize in one crop are characterized by one 
or more of the following: a high level of producer risk aversion, a low crop price elasticity, a 
high co-variability of yields for different crops within a region, and a low variability of 
revenues under full diversification in both regions.  Furthermore, the producers’ welfare (in 
the ex ante sense) may be higher under incomplete specialization relative to full diversifica-
tion in the environment analyzed in the paper. 
An interesting implication of the analysis is that under certain conditions, more volatile 
prices and an uneven distribution of crop production across regions may contribute to stabi-
lizing crop revenues “more” than would an even distribution of crop production and stable 
prices. This happens when price volatility is attributed to yield volatility in a way that damp-
ens the fluctuations in the gross crop revenues received by growers but leaves enough upside 
potential. Producers may benefit from allocating their land between a relatively risky crop 
with high mean revenue and a relatively safe crop with low mean revenue as compared with 
the land allocation among crops with moderate risks and mean revenues. This insight com-
plements the literature on government intervention in agricultural markets, in which the 
effects of price-stabilizing schemes are studied under the assumption that stochastic output 
price is exogenous (Chambers and Quiggin 2003). 
The production environment studied here is plausible when a growing area can be di-
vided into regions, each possessed of a relatively high systemic yield risk as compared with 
the level of systemic yield risk across the regions (Wang and Zang 2003).5 Statistical litera-
ture and several branches of the economics of risk and uncertainty offer a number of 
multivariate dependence concepts that can be used to model systemic risk and positive 
dependence among random variables (Joe 1997). To model spatial yield dependence struc-
ture, the concept of dependence known as the supermodular stochastic order is employed. 
This concept of dependence is commonly used in a wide variety of contexts and is appealing 
on a number of grounds.  
This approach to modeling spatial yield dependence is more general than the “linear ad-
ditive model” based on the decomposition of the farm-level yield into the sum of systemic 
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and idiosyncratic components that is usually used in the context of area-yield insurance 
(Ramaswami and Roe 2004). As Ramaswami and Roe point out, this decomposition requires 
a considerable amount of structure on farm-level production functions and the implicit level 
of aggregation. In agricultural economics, the supermodular stochastic order was used by 
Hennessy, Saak, and Babcock (2003) to model dependence among crop revenues to study the 
choice between whole-farm and crop-specific revenue insurance. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The first section presents the multivariate 
dependence concept that is used to model spatial intra- and inter-regional farm-level yield 
dependence structure. Then the model of the acreage allocation by risk-averse producers in a 
two-crop, two-region setting with yield uncertainty and endogenous prices is developed. 
Next, it is shown that regions with similar growing conditions cannot specialize in one crop 
because producing a single crop is dominated by farm-level crop diversification when the 
price elasticity is sufficiently high, or the intra-regional dependence among yields for differ-
ent crops is low (Result 1). After investigating some determinants of the expected crop 
revenues (Lemma 1), a convenient case is presented in which regions as well as the ex ante 
revenues for the two crops are symmetric in all respects. Once it has been established that in 
such an environment the 50/50 crop mix is always an equilibrium (Lemma 2), it is shown 
that this is the only possible equilibrium under risk neutrality (Result 2). In the rest of the 
paper the effect of the introduction of risk aversion on the optimal crop mix when prices and 
revenues are endogenous at the market level is examined. Following a demonstration that 
regions may completely specialize in one crop when farm-level yields for different crops are 
comonotic within each region (Result 3), incomplete specialization in less restrictive and 
more realistic environments is analyzed. A sufficient condition is provided in the case of 
mean-variance utility (Result 4), and a necessary and sufficient condition is provided for the 
existence of a utility function such that equilibria with incomplete specialization exist (Result 
5). Some discussion of the limitations and practical aspects of the analysis is offered in the 
conclusions.  
 
Multivariate Dependence Concept 
To model spatial yield correlation we will use the following concept of positive depend-
ence among multivariate random variables (e.g., see Shaked and Shanthikumar 1994).6  
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DEFINITION 1. (The Supermodular Stochastic Order) A multivariate probability distribution 
)(xG G  is said to be smaller than the probability distribution )(xG G′  in the supermodular 
stochastic order (denoted by sm≺ ) if GdxdGx ′≤ ∫∫ )()( GG φφ  for all supermodular functions φ  
for which the expectations exist, where },...,{ 1 nxxx =G . 
 
A function φ  is called supermodular (submodular) if for any pair ji xx ,  with evaluations 
ii xx ′′>′  and jj xx ′′>′  we have )(),...,,,...,(),...,,,...,( 11 ≤≥′′′′+′′ njinji xxxxxxxx φφ ,,...,( 1 ixx ′φ  
),...,,,...,(),..., 1 njinj xxxxxx ′′′+′′ φ . The supermodularity is equivalent to the “increasing 
differences” property: 0)( ≥∆∆ xji Gφδε  for 2,1, =ji , ji ≠ , 0>ε , and 0>δ , where 
),...,,...,(),...,,...,(),...,( 111 ninini xxxxxxxx φεφφε −+=∆ .7 In other words, the value of a 
supermodular function increases more with ix  when other ijx j ≠,  take on high values. 
The supermodular stochastic order extends the idea of capturing the strength of positive 
dependence in the bivariate ( 21 , xx ) case: “big (small) values of 1x  go with big (small) values 
of 2,x ” to a multivariate case. Muller and Scarcini (2000) showed that the supermodular 
stochastic order satisfies the set of appealing axioms that define a multivariate positive 
dependence order (Joe 1997). One of the attractive features of the supermodular stochastic 
ordering is its immediate connection with a more familiar notion of correlation. Namely, let 
the vector of random variables nXX ,...,1  and nYY ,...,1   have the joint probability distribution 
)(XG  and )(YG′ , respectively. Then one can easily show that GG sm ′≺  implies that 
))(),(())(),(( jiji YgYfCovXgXfCov ≤  for any nji ,...,1, = , and functions f  and g  are 
monotonic in the same direction given that the covariances exist. 
To further appreciate why this concept allows us to order the random vectors by the de-
gree of interdependence (or systematic risk) consider the following. Imagine that the joint 
probability distribution is transformed using the procedure described next. The probability 
mass is shifted away from the realizations when some components of the vector have high 
values while others have low values to the realizations when all components of the vector are 
simultaneously high, or simultaneously low.  
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In the case of the bivariate random variables with two-point marginal distributions, this 
procedure is illustrated in Figure 1, where 0>ε  so that GG sm ′≺ . Note that the realizations 
when both 1x  and 2x  take “high” or “low” values are more likely while the realizations 
when 1x  and 2x  “mismatch” are less likely under the transformed distribution G′  compared 
to G . The expectation of a supermodular function increases under the transformed joint 
probability distribution because supermodular functions “reward” the evaluations with 
relatively more aligned components (“all are low” or “all are high”). The supermodular 
ordering is possible only if the distributions )(xG G  and )(xG G′  are possessed of the same 
marginals (in what follows, this requirement will be satisfied by definition). 
 
Model 
There are two regions, A  and B , each consisting of, respectively, n  and m  farms that 
produce two crops: c  and s . The size of each farm is normalized to equal one unit of land. 
Yield for crop o  in region r  on farm i  is a random variable ],[ ooori yyy ∈ , where sco ,= , 
BAr ,= , )(,...,1 mni = . The joint probability distribution of farm-level yields for both crops 
in both regions is ,,...,,,...,( 11
c
Bm
c
B
c
An
c
A yyyyF ,...,1
s
Ay ,
s
Any ),...,1
s
Bm
s
B yy  with support on 
[ , ] [ , ] .c sc nm s nmy y y y×  Let ,...,,,...,( 11 srcrncrr yyyF r )srnry  be the marginal joint distribution of 
farm-level yields for both crops in region r , ),...,( 1
o
rn
o
r
o
r r
yyF  be the marginal joint distribu-
tion of farm-level yields for crop o  in region r , and )( ori
o
ri yF  be the distribution of yields for 
crop o  in region r  on farm i , all consistent with F , where nnA =  and mnB = . We make 
the following assumptions about the nature of the spatial farm-level yield dependence 
structure in each region and across the regions.  
 
),( 21 xxG  lowx1  
highx1   
lowx2  lowlowp ,  highlowp ,       ⇒  
highx2  lowhighp ,  highhighp ,   
 
),( 21 xxG′  lowx1  highx1  
lowx2  ε+lowlowp ,  ε−highlowp ,  
highx2  ε−lowhighp , ε+highhighp ,  
 
 
FIGURE 1.  Increase in positive dependence 
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ASSUMPTION 1. (Spatial Yield Dependence Structure)  
 (a) F BA FF ⋅=  (independence across regions); 
 (b) orsm
o
rn
o
r FFF r ≺⋅⋅ ...1  for sco ,=  and BAr ,=  (positive dependence across farm 
yields in each region for the same crop); 
 (c) rsm
s
r
c
r FFF ≺⋅  for BAr ,=  (positive dependence across farm yields in each 
region for different crops). 
 
According to part (a), the yields are independent across regions but not necessarily across 
crops within a region. Namely, parts (b) and (c) state that the yields are positively correlated 
for the same crop as well as across crops within a region.8 Part (c) implies that yields for 
different crops on an individual farm are also positively dependent, that is, )()( sri
s
ri
c
ri
c
ri yFyF ⋅  
),( sri
c
rirism yyF≺ . This spatial yield dependence structure is consistent with the condition that 
crop yields follow a finite-range positive dependent (f.r.p.d.) spatial process (Wang and 
Zhang 2003). A spatial yield process is f.r.p.d. if the correlation between yields on any two 
land plots is positive when the distance between the plots is within a certain range and is zero 
or negative otherwise.9 
The inverse demand for crop o  is )( oo YP , where ∑ ∑== BAr j orjorjo yY , α  is the aggre-
gate output harvested in both regions, and oriα  is the share of farm i’s acreage sown to crop o  
in region r , 1=+ srjcrj αα .10 The per acre revenue for crop o  in region r  on farm i  is oriR  
)( oo YP= oriy  oric− , where oric  is the per acre production cost. Each producer owns one farm 
(a unit of land) and is a von-Neumann and Morgenstern expected utility maximizer. The 
producer’s expected utility conditional on the acreage allocation is criririri REuU )1(()( αα −=  
)sriri Rα+ , where u  is a twice differentiable utility function with 0>′riu  and 0<′′u ; [.]E  is 
the expectation operator with respect to the distribution F  or the relevant marginals of F ; 
and criri αα −= 1 .11 Producers choose the acreage allocation between crops c  and s , 
]1,0[∈riα , to solve 
 )(max ririU
ri
αα , (1) 
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with the interior optimality condition given by 
 0)])()1(([)( =−+−′= crisrisricriri RRRRuEV ααα . (2) 
The problem is well behaved because )( ririU α  is strictly concave in riα  when prices are 
exogenous to the producer’s problem. The mix of the crops is produced if 0)( =αriV  for 
)1,0(∈α , and the farm is specialized in one crop with 0=α  if 0)0( ≤riV , or 1=α  if 
0)1( ≥riV . Next we verify that each region cannot be an exclusive producer of a crop when 
there are no comparative advantages in crop production across regions and growing a mix of 
crops lowers overall risk exposure of the operation. Proofs of results are in the Appendix. 
 
RESULT 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds , and either (i) 0)()( ≤+′ ∑∑ i orioorji orio yPyyP  
for all evaluations orjy , sco ,= ; or (ii) ,(),...,(),...,,,...,( 1111 srsrcrncrcrsrnsrcrncrr yFyyFyyyyF rrr ⋅=  
)..., srnry , BAr ,= , and (iii) )/()(][/][][/][ sBjcBjsAicAisBjsAicBjcAi ccccyEyEyEyE −−==  for 
ni ,...,1= , and mj ,...,1= . Then both regions cannot specialize in equilibrium. 
 
Result 1 presents sufficient conditions such that under complete regional specialization in 
one crop the expected revenue for the crop that is not locally grown warrants an adjustment 
in cropland allocation. This holds for any level of non-negative, farm-level yield dependence 
among different crops in each region as well as any degree of producer risk aversion.  
Note that if the curvature properties of the inverse demand functions are known, that is, 
0)(>≤′′oP , condition (i) is satisfied if 0)()( ≤+′ ooooo ynPyynP , or nyne oo ≥)(  (respec-
tively, ooo yynP )(′  )( oo ynP+ 0≤ , or ))(/())(()( oooooooo yynPyynPnyne ≥ ), both of which 
are easy to verify, where =)(yeo )(/)( yPyyP oo′−  is the price elasticity for crop o . Any one 
of these conditions assures that the expected marginal utility from switching to an alternative 
crop is sufficiently high when each region producers only one crop. This happens because the 
local yields for the crop grown elsewhere are uncorrelated with that crop’s price, and the 
prices are sufficiently elastic to assure that “good weather is worse than bad weather.” 
Because of the positive intra-farm yield correlation for different crops, high local farm-level 
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yields for a crop grown elsewhere coincide with high yields for the crop grown in the area 
that cause the crop’s price to drop (highly elastic) and the marginal utility of gross farm 
income (that exclusively consists of the revenue from the locally grown crop) to rise. The 
converse is true when yields for the alternative crop are low. To recap, high local yields for 
the crop produced mostly elsewhere likely coincide with high marginal utility, and low local 
yields for the crop produced mostly elsewhere likely coincide with low marginal utility since 
farm-level yields for different crops are correlated. It is in this way that, under regional 
specialization, growing a mix of crops constitutes a form of protection against income 
variability. It works because the price for the other crop does not depend on the local yields. 
Otherwise, a potentially onerous condition (i) can be dispensed with if the farm-level 
yields for different crops are assumed to be independent, as in condition (ii). Note that when 
we abandon these assumptions, in what follows, equilibrium with complete specialization 
will be shown to exist (see the section titled “Complete Specialization under Risk Aversion,” 
Result 3). Condition (iii) assures that no farm or region has a “built-in” comparative advan-
tage to specialize in a certain crop. Under these conditions, complete specialization in both 
regions is impossible under any level of risk aversion (including risk neutrality.). The intui-
tion is as follows. 
Suppose that both regions completely specialize in one of the crops, for example, region 
A is the sole producer of crop c, and region B is the sole producer of crop s. As is well known 
from the analysis of the standard portfolio problem, given the opportunity to subdivide risks, 
a risk-averter may avoid investing in one of the two independent risky assets only if the mean 
return for that asset is lower. Therefore, the expectation of crop s revenue in region A must be 
lower than that for crop c, while the expectation of crop c revenue in region B must be lower 
than that for crop s. But these conditions cannot hold simultaneously because, under As-
sumption 1 and complete specialization, the price risk is independent of the individual yield 
risk for the crop that is not grown in the region. The fact that the individual yield and the 
price as a function of aggregated individual yields are negatively correlated assures that for 
producers in region A  the expected revenue for the alternative crop s  will be higher than for 
crop c, and the converse is true for producers in region B. Because there is no regional 
comparative advantage, this is impossible in equilibrium with complete specialization. The 
following example demonstrates that even when complete specialization in one crop elimi-
10 / Saak 
nates any randomness in the crop revenue it cannot be in equilibrium, no matter what prefer-
ences toward risk are exhibited by producers. 
 
EXAMPLE 1. Let 1}Pr{ == orori yy  so that all yield risk is systematic within a region, and 
there is no farm-specific risk. Furthermore, we hold that yields for different crops cry  and 
s
ry  
are independent in each region, ][][ oB
o
A yEyE =  for sco ,= , the inverse demand functions 
are )(yPc )(yPs= y/1= , and production costs are invariant across farms in both regions, and 
are normalized to zero, 0=oric . The crop revenues evaluated at 0* =Aiα  and 1* =Bjα  are 
nRcAi /1= , )/( sBsAsAi myyR = , mR sBi /1= , and )/( cAcBcBi nyyR = . Hence, using the proof of 
Result 1, complete specialization implies that ]/[/ sB
s
A yyEnm >  and ]/[/ cAcB yyEmn > . 
However, this is impossible since 1]/[ >oBoA yyE  for sco ,= . This is because the expected 
revenue for the crop with price risk that is independent of the producer-specific yield risk is 
greater than that for the crop with a price that is negatively correlated with the farm-level 
yield. 
 
To proceed with the analysis of the possible equilibrium levels of regional specialization, 
it is convenient to consider environments with homogenous producers in the manner of 
Example 1. The characterization of equilibrium land allocation is straightforward when there 
is no heterogeneity in production decisions within each region. To this end, we make the 
following.  
 
ASSUMPTION 2. (Symmetry Across Farms within Each Region)  
 (a) ),...,,,...,(),...,,,...,( )()1()()1(11
s
nr
s
r
c
nr
c
rr
s
rn
s
r
c
rn
c
rr rrrr
yyyyFyyyyF ϕϕππ=  for sco ,= , 
BAr ,= , and any permutations of indices π , ϕ ; 
 (b) or
o
ri cc =  for all rni ,...,1= , BAr ,=  (production costs are invariant across farms); 
(c) (.)(.) uuri =  for rni ,...,1= , BAr ,=  (attitudes to risk are invariant across  
producers). 
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Part (a) of Assumption 2 states that the farms in each region are homogenous in the sense of 
having identical farm-level yield probability distributions for both crops so that, in particular, 
),(),( scrj
sc
ri yyFyyF =  for any ji, , BAr ,= . A commonly used restriction that yields are 
identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) is a special case of this assumption since we 
allow for positive dependence among farm-level yields in each region (across crops and 
across farms). In addition, according to parts (b) and (c), production costs as well as risk 
attitudes are common for all farmers in the region. Because within a region all producers are 
(ex ante) identical by Assumption 2, and the solution of (1) is unique, in equilibrium we have 
rri αα =* , BAr ,= . 
In general, the extent of specialization as measured by the difference between the shares 
of acres under crop s  in region A , Aα , and in region B , Bα , has an ambiguous effect on 
the crop revenues. This is because the yield risk enters the gross farm revenue, which is equal 
to the product of the crop price—a decreasing function of the aggregate output—and the 
individual farm output twice. Let us consider this point in more detail. 
Expected Crop Revenues and Inter-regional Acreage Allocation   
Suppose that a share of crop c  produced in a region A is large and begins to decline. 
Then the negative price-yield correlation for crop c  in region A  is likely to weaken because 
a smaller share of the aggregate yield depends on the average yield in region A, which is 
correlated with an individual farm-level yield in region A. Therefore, the expected value of 
crop c revenue increases because a large individual yield for crop c in region A is less likely 
to be offset by a small price, and, conversely, a small yield is less likely to coincide with a 
high price. On the other hand, the volatility of the aggregate yield also declines because there 
is less “undiversified” systematic risk present in region A that enters the aggregate yield. This 
lowers the expected value of the revenue function if the crop’s inverse demand is convex in 
the total output. This is formalized in the following lemma. 
 
LEMMA 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 and part (a) of Assumption 2 hold , }Pr{ Yy
i
o
Ai ≤∑  
}Pr{ Yy
i
o
Bi ≤= ∑ , and crop o is produced exclusively in region A. Then the expected revenue 
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for crop o in region A, oAiER , increases (decreases) with the share of the crop produced in 
region B depending on 1)(/)( >≤′′′− oo PyyP  for all ],[ oo ynyny∈ . 
 
Note that the expected revenue increases as the region gives up its exclusive position in 
production if the inverse demand function is concave. In this case both the decline in the 
aggregate output volatility (some of the region’s systematic risk is now diversified away by 
the other region’s systematic risk) and the weakening of the negative price-yield correlation 
work in the same direction.  
In order to understand the role of risk diversification motives behind acreage allocation 
it appears useful to first consider equilibrium under risk neutraility and then study the equilib-
rium effects of risk aversion. However, Lemma 1 illustrates that, without some restrictions on 
the demand environment, the expected crop revenue differential, ][ sri
c
ri RRE − , is, in general, 
non-monotone in the extent of regional (farm-level) specialization in a certain crop, *rα . This 
may lead to the multiplicity of equilibrium levels of regional specialization caused by the 
special features of the demand and production environments as well as the consequences of 
expected utility maximization. Therefore, it may be difficult to disentangle the effect of risk 
management considerations (second-order effect) on equilibrium land allocation pattern 
when the expected incremental profit from switching crops (first-order effect) is non-
monotone in the inter-regional crop production distribution. 
To circumvent this difficulty and highlight the role of risk aversion in acreage allocation 
patterns, we consider a special benchmark case where equilibrium under risk neutrality is 
unique. It turns out that the expected crop revenue differential is monotone in the regional 
share of the total plantings when revenues are held to follow identical probability distribu-
tions for both crops in both regions. Note that this approach generates monotonicity without 
any restrictions on the inverse demand functions.  
Identical Crops, Regions, and 50/50 Diversification Equilibrium  
To proceed, the following symmetry assumption about the probability distributions of 
crop revenues is introduced. Throughout the rest of the paper, total acreage under each crop 
is kept constant and invariant across crops: 1=+ BA αα  and mn =  (regions are of the same 
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size). Let );,( αsricri RRT  denote the farm-level joint probability distribution of the crop 
revenues on farm i  in region r  conditional on the acreage allocation α , where )(αoriR  
∑= j oAjo yP α( ∑−+ j orioBj yy ))1( α oric− . 
 
ASSUMPTION 3. (Symmetry across Crops and Regions)  
 (a) For any ]1,0[∈α  the crop revenues are exchangeable random variables: 
);,( αsricri RRT );,( αcrisri RRT= , BAr ,=  (symmetry across crops within each region); 
 (b) ),...,,,...,(),...,,,...,( 1111
s
Bn
s
B
c
Bn
c
BB
s
An
s
A
c
An
c
AA yyyyFyyyyF =  (symmetry across  
regions); 
 (c) oor cc =  for BAr ,=  (production costs invariant across regions). 
 
For example, part (a) of the assumption is satisfied under the following circumstances. The 
yields for the two crops differ by a scale parameter, say, sri
c
ri ayy = , so that ),...,( 1 cBncAc yyF  
,/( 1 ayF
c
A
s= ..., )/ ay sBn , the scale-parameter-adjusted inverse demands for crops coincide, 
)(yPc  )(ayaP s= , and the per acre production costs are the same for both crops, sc cc = . 
However, such stringent conditions are not necessary in order for part (a) of Assumption 3 to 
hold. Part (b) stipulates that the yields for both crops are ex ante identical across regions in 
the sense of both having identical marginals and identical intra-regional dependence structure 
in each region. In other words, yields in region A  are an independent replica of yields in 
region B . Part (c) assures that all aspects of the production environment are invariant across 
regions as well as across farms within each region. 
Given that αα =A  and αα −= 1B , the expected utility for a producer in region A  is 
)1(()( αα −= EuU Ai )1( α−cAiR ))(αα sAiR+ , while that for a producer in region B  is 
)1( α−BjU )1(( αα −= cBjREu ))()1( αα sBjR−+ . 
 
LEMMA 2. Suppose Assumptions 1 through 3 hold. Then )1()( αα −= BjAi UU  for all ji, , 
where Aαα = Bα−= 1 , and there always exists equilibrium with 5.0** == BA αα . 
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In light of Lemma 2, the main bite of Assumption 3 is that it allows us to characterize 
equilibrium using just one variable, α , since the regions are held to reciprocate each other’s 
land allocation pattern. The focus of the inquiry is then solely on the regional specialization, 
Aαα = Bα−= 1 , in which we dropped the subscript for the region. In addition, Assumptions 
2 and 3 provide a very convenient calibration because there always exists equilibrium where 
producers in both regions follow a 50/50 crop enterprise diversification plan. Next we 
demonstrate that the 50/50 plan is the only possible equilibrium when producers are risk 
neutral.  
Uniqueness of 50/50 Acreage Allocation under Risk Neutrality 
To isolate better the role of risk aversion on the diversification behavior as revealed 
through the crop mix produced on farm, we consider the case of risk-neutral producers. 
Under risk neutrality, individual decisions of producers within a region are indeterminate, so 
we continue to refer to α  ( α−1 ) as the share of acreage allocated to crop s in region A (B) 
both at farm and regional levels. 
 
RESULT 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1 through 3 hold and producers are risk neutral. Then 
equilibrium in which both regions allocate half of their acreage to each crop, 5.0* =α , is 
unique. 
 
Note that part (a) of Assumption 1 can be weakened by only requiring that the positive 
dependence of yields within the region exceeds that across regions: o AkAism
o
BjAi FF ,, ≺  for all 
kji ,, , which will assure that )0()1( sAi
c
Ai ERER <  and )1()0( sAicAi ERER > , and the case is 
similar for region B. We find that under Assumptions 1 through 3, the expected incremental 
revenue from switching crops is monotone in the share of the regional acreage in the total 
acres under a crop. This is because the increase in the aggregate yield volatility due to a 
greater share of undiversified systematic risk present at the regional level has the same effect 
on the revenues from both crops. This allows us to isolate the effect of the increase in the 
price-yield correlation on the expected revenue, which has an unambiguous sign. While 
unrealistic, Assumption 3 is very useful in highlighting the role of risk aversion and risk 
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diversification motives in equilibrium acreage allocation patterns across different regions. 
This is the subject of the inquiry in the following sections. 
Complete Specialization under Risk Aversion 
In this section we decompose the yield risk into systematic (regional) and farm-specific 
components in the manner of Ramaswami and Roe (2004). Furthermore, we restrict part (c) 
of Assumption 1 by imposing a particularly strong dependence structure among the (average) 
yields for different crops within each region as follows. 
 
ASSUMPTION 4. (Yield Decomposition and High Correlation among Yields for Different 
Crops in a Region) 
 (a) Yield for crop o  in region r  on farm i  is ori
o
r
o
ri
o
ri yy εβ += , where 0>oriβ , 
nori∑ =β , and [ | ]o ori rE y yε =  = 0 for all y , sco ,= , BAr ,= , ni ,...,1= ;  
 (b) Average yields in each region are “highly” correlated across crops, ( , )c sr r rF y y =  
min[ ( ),c cr rF y )](
s
r
s
r yF , BAr ,=  (comonotonic systemic components of yields for different 
crops within each region). 
 
Part (a) of Assumption 4 is the standard “linear additive” formulation of spatial yield de-
pendence, ∑ ][ oriyE orny= . Part (b) postulates that in each region the average yields for the 
two crops are highly (in fact, “perfectly” in the sense of possible dependence structures) 
correlated. The distribution function of the form ),(min[ cr
c
r yF )](
s
r
s
r yF  is called the upper 
Frechet bound (Joe 1997). It is a well-known property of the upper Frechet bound that any 
probability distribution ),(min[),( xHyxH x≤ )]( yH y  where )( ),( yHxH yx  are marginals of 
),( yxH . The random variables with distribution function ),( yxH ),(min[ xH x= )]( yH y  are 
called comonotonic and are possessed of the highest possible degree of dependence, that is, 
),( yxH ),(min[ xH xsm≺ )]( yH y  for any distribution function ),( yxH . Observe that if 
( )srF y = ( )crF y , then the imposed correlation structure implies that 1)Pr( == crsr yy .  
Next we determine conditions when complete regional specialization in one crop is pos-
sible in equilibrium under the assumption that the “average” yields for different crops in each 
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region are perfectly correlated. Let )(/)()( wuwuwQ ririri ′′′−=  and )(ˆ wQri )(wwQri=  denote 
the Arrow-Pratt measures of risk aversion and relative risk aversion, respectively. 
 
RESULT 3. Suppose that part (a) of Assumption 1, part (a) of Assumption 3 at 0=α  and 
1=α , and Assumption 4 hold. In addition, let (i) 1)0Pr( ==oriε  for all iro ,, ; and (ii) 
)(ˆ( oriri RQ 1))(1)()( ≥−+ nyecRQ oorioriri  for all ],[ oo yyy∈ , where oriorioori cynyPR −= β)( , 
sco ,= . Then there exist equilibria in which each region produces only one crop, 0* =Aiα  
and 1* =Bjα , or 1* =Aiα  and 0* =Bjα . 
 
Note that in equilibrium where each farm grows only one crop, farmers have no incen-
tive to grow both crops even though the expected revenue for the crop produced locally is 
less than that for the crop grown in the other region (see the proof of Result 4). In this case, 
the benefits provided by the “natural hedge” outweigh the benefits of whole-farm revenue 
risk reduction achieved through crop diversification.  
Condition (i) of Result 3 states that there is no farm-specific yield risk for both crops.12 
This, combined with part (b) of Assumption 4, assumes away any benefits from crop diversi-
fication at the farm level. These restrictions are unrealistic and are made purely for the 
expositional convenience. However, note that we make no use of Assumption 2 that farmers 
are homogenous in the sense of having identical yield distributions and attitudes toward risk 
because the optimality conditions at the corner solutions hold as inequalities.  Also, Assump-
tion 3 that crop revenues have identical probability distributions conditional on symmetric 
acreage allocation can be easily relaxed.  In this light, Result 3 emphasizes risk-aversion as 
the main driver behind regional specialization. The postulated very strong positive depend-
ence among yields for different crops within the region allows us to find a simple condition 
for equilibrium regional specialization that relates to the degrees of risk aversion and relative 
risk aversion and has an interesting intuitive interpretation.  
Because the diversification benefits associated with multiple crops are assumed away, 
the “natural hedge” provided by the negative price-yield relationship is of particularly high 
value to risk-averters. However, even in that case, the degree of risk aversion and/or relative 
risk aversion as well as production costs must be sufficiently high to counterbalance the 
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incentive provided by switching to the crop produced in the other region that has higher 
expected revenue for local producers. A sufficiently low price elasticity (less than one) 
guarantees that this, in fact, is the case. 
Note that an increase in the price elasticity has an ambiguous effect on the incentive to 
specialize in one crop. On the one hand, the “natural hedge’ effect is enhanced because of a 
better cap on the revenue when yields are low. On the other hand, the expected revenue from 
growing the alternative crop is also higher. When the price elasticity is sufficiently high 
(greater than one), the latter effect always dominates, and no equilibrium with complete 
specialization exists. Compare this finding with sufficient conditions (i) and (ii) for equilib-
rium crop diversification in Result 1.  
 Incomplete Specialization under Risk Aversion 
In the previous section, the outcomes in which regions completely specialize in one of 
the crops were due to the limited benefits of growing a plural number of crops as a result of 
the imposed very strong positive dependence among the yields for different crops within the 
region. In this section we demonstrate that this is neither necessary nor sufficient to generate 
equilibria with incomplete diversification as opposed to the unique 50/50 diversification 
equilibrium under risk neutrality previously characterized. And so, in contrast to Assumption 
4, we assume that yields for different crops are independent within a region (in addition to 
the independence across the regions in part (a) of Assumption 1). 
 
ASSUMPTION 5. ),...,(),...,(),...,,,...,( 1111
s
rn
s
r
s
r
c
rn
c
r
c
r
s
rn
s
r
c
rn
c
rr yyFyyFyyyyF =  for BAr ,= . 
 
In particular, Assumption 5 implies that yields for different crops on an individual farm are 
also independent, that is, )()(),( sri
s
ri
c
ri
c
ri
s
ri
c
riri yFyFyyF = , and thus proffer a venue for an 
effective risk management through crop enterprise diversification.. By Lemma 2, the equilib-
rium with incomplete diversification, }5.0/{)1,0(∈α , is given by13 
 0))1()())(()1()1(()( =−−+−−′= ααααααα cAisAisAicAiAi RRRRuEV . (3) 
In order to ascertain whether 5.0* =α  is the only possible equilibrium under risk aversion, 
we will need some properties of the interior optimality condition (3). The following lemma is 
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an immediate consequence of Result 1 as part (a) of Assumption 2 (farms are identical in 
each region), parts (b) and (c) of Assumption 3 (regions are identical), and Assumption 5 
(yields for different crops within the region are independent) imply that conditions (ii) and 
(iii) in Result 1 are satisfied. 
 
LEMMA 3. Suppose Assumptions 1 through 3 and 5 hold. Then 0)0( >AiV , 0)1( <AiV . 
 
According to Lemma 3, equilibria where each region completely specializes in one crop are 
impossible under Assumptions 1 through 3, and 5. Also, Lemmas 2 and 3 imply that if 
0)5.0( >′AiV  then there must exist equilibria with )5.0,0(∈α )1,5.0(∪ . Furthermore, any 
equilibrium with 5.0≠α  is non-trivially different from complete diversification equilibrium 
because 0)5.0( =′′AiV  since we have )(αAiV ′′  )1( α−′′−= AiV . After some algebra, differentia-
tion of equation (3) and evaluation at 5.0=α  yields 
 ))(())((([)5.0( cA
s
A
s
AAi RRwQRwuEV −−′′=′ ))])(( ′+− sAcAsA RRR , (4) 
where )(5.0 sA
c
A RRw += , )5.0(oAioA RR =  and )()5.0()( ,,, ∑∑∑ −′=′ jr sBjjr sAjsAijr srjssA yyyyPR , 
in order to minimize notation. Expression (4) is difficult to sign for several reasons. One is 
the a priori ambiguous effect of the change in risk on the demand for risky assets in the 
presence of other risky investments (Gollier 2001). Another reason is, of course, due to the 
endogeneity of crop revenue risks at the market level. One way to proceed is to impose some 
restrictions on the properties of the utility function and the demand and production environ-
ments. We shall take this route in the next section.  
Incomplete Specialization: Mean-Variance Preferences 
Consider the case of the mean-variance preferences: ][][)( wVarwEU Ai λα −= , where 
)()1()1( αααα sAicAi RRw +−−= , and 0≥λ  is the disutility from bearing a unit of risk. 
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RESULT 4. Suppose that Assumptions 1 through 3 and 5 hold, ][][)( wVarwEU Ai λα −= , and 
][ sARVar ])(,[ ′−< sAsA RRCov . Then equilibria with incomplete diversification, )5.0,0(* ∈α  
)1,5.0(∪  exist if λλ ˆ>  , where ])[(ˆ ′= sAREλ +][(2/ sARVar ]))(,[ ′sAsA RRCov . 
 
Note that the minimum required level of risk disutility, λˆ , increases with the variance of 
crop revenues under complete diversification, ][ sARVar , because 0])[( <′sARE  (see the proof 
of Result 4). However, in general, the intuition behind the minimum required level of risk 
disutility needs to be viewed with caution because of the undesirable property of the quad-
ratic utility function that the level of risk aversion, )(wQ , increases with wealth. 
Furthermore, from the proof of Result 2 we know that the expected crop revenue differential 
is a single-crossing function of α : sAicAi ERER <  for 5.0<α , and sAicAi ERER >  for 5.0>α .14 
Because both crops are produced in equilibria with )5.0,0(* ∈α , the riskiness associated with 
the revenue for crop c  in region A  is also less than that for crop s , ][][ sAi
c
Ai RVarRVar < .15 
The situation is reversed in equilibria with )1,5.0(* ∈α . The trade-offs between the expected 
crop revenues and risks in region B  are analogous. 
Observe that the producer welfare measured by the expected utility of farming may be 
higher when }5.0/{)1,0(* ∈α  (and may, therefore, provide a means of redistributing welfare 
in the society from consumers to agricultural producers). Under partial specialization, by 
symmetry, the expected utility must have at least three local optima ( *3
*
2
*
1 5.0 ααα <=<  ). 
Among these there must be equilibria in which the producer’s expected utility is greater than 
that in the full diversification equilibrium. This is because the expected utility increases with 
α  in some range around 5.0=α . Note that conditions 0)5.0( >′AiV  and 0)5.0( =AiV  imply 
that 0)( >αAiV  for all αα ˆ,5.0(∈ ), where ,0)(:inf{ˆ == ααα AiV 1}5.0 <>α  because, by 
Lemma 3, 0)1( <AiV  and function )(αAiV  is continuous (as it is differentiable). This implies 
that there is an 5.0ˆ ≠α  with )ˆ(αriU  )ˆ1( α−= riU )5.0(riU>  that is also in equilibrium since 
)ˆ(αAiV  )ˆ1( α−−= AiV 0= . Summarizing, we have the following. 
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COROLLARY. Suppose that Assumptions 1 through 3 and 5 hold, and 0)5.0( >′AiV . Let 
,0)(:{ ==Ε αα riV  }5.0≠α . Then )5.0()(sup riri UU >Ε∈ αα . 
 
The following example illustrates some of the equilibrium properties and welfare implica-
tions in the case of mean-variance utility. 
 
EXAMPLE 2. As in Example 1, let 1}Pr{ == orori yy  so that all yield risk is systematic within a 
region, and there is no farm-specific risk. Under Assumption 5 yields for different crops cry  
and sry  are independent within a region. The inverse demand functions are )(yPc )(yPs=  
y/1= , and production costs are zero, 0== cs cc . Furthermore, let ory  follow a two-point 
distribution: yy or =  and yy or =  with equal probability. The crop revenues are )(αcAiR  
);1( cyR α−=  and );()( ssAi yRR αα = , where 1)))1((();( −−+= oo ynyR ααα , and the 
random variable oA
o
B
o yyy /=  follows a three-point distribution ( ,/;5.0,1 ;25.0,/ yyyy )25.0  
because oAy  and 
o
By  are independent, sco ,= . Hence, the first and second moments of the 
crop revenues are calculated as follows: 5.0(/1)1()( nERERcAi =−= αα  α−+ 1/(25.0  
++ )/ yyα ))/1/(25.0 yyαα +− , 5.0(/1)1()( 222 nERERcAi =−= αα α−+ 1/(25.0  
2)/ yyα+ ))/1/(25.0 2yyαα +−+ , )()( αα ERER sAi = , and 2)(αsAiER  2)(αER= .  
In this case, the expectation of the returns to farming is invariant to the acreage alloca-
tion because =+−= )()()1()( ααααα sAicAi EREREw n/1  for all ]1,0[∈α . And so, acreage 
allocation, α , affects the expected utility only through the riskiness of the grower’s position. 
It is straightforward to show that the variance of the crop revenue mix, )]([ αwVar , is U-
shaped with the peak at 5.0=α . The variances of revenues for crop c  and s  in region A  
respectively increase and decrease as α  increases (the converse is true for region B ). The 
returns to farming are “risk free” (and hence maximize producer welfare) if each region 
specializes in one crop, say, region A  is the exclusive producer of crop c  and region B  is 
the exclusive producer of crop s . Then under any resolution of yield uncertainty we have 
nRR sBj
c
Ai /1)0()0( ==  for all producers. In this case, the expected utility of wealth derived 
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from farming is nRuERuE sBj
c
Ai /1))]0(([))]0(([ ==  for each producer in both regions. From 
the producer welfare point of view, the expected utility is maximized under complete spe-
cialization in one crop in each region: 0=eα  or 1=eα , that is, )()1()0( αririri UUU >=  for 
all )1,0(∈α . This is because an individual grower does not take into account the effect of 
acreage allocation on systematic yield risk at the regional level. 
The trade-offs between risk and return for the two crops are depicted in Figure 2, where 
)( oriRσ  is the standard deviation of crop revenue oriR . Note that the expected gross revenues 
are non-monotone in the share of land planted to crop s . This is because the inverse demand 
function is convex, which implies that the effect of a decreased volatility and negative price-
yield correlation go in the opposite directions. For example, when plantings of crop c  in 
region A  are large, 75.01 >−α , the volatility effect dominates and the revenue for crop c  
in region A , ][ cAiRE , falls as α  increases. However, for 25.0≥α  the effect due to a weaker  
negative price-yield correlation dominates, and the revenue increases with the share of 
crop c  produced in region B . Furthermore, for 5.0>α , the crop c  output variability 
increases with α  because more of the systemic risk is now coming from region B  where 
most of the crop is grown. This has a positive effect on the expected price for crop c , 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Crop revenues’ risks and returns 
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))1(( cB
c
Ac nynyEP αα +− , so that the expected revenue for crop c  in region A  increases at an 
increasing rate. 
To determine the lower bound on the disutility of risk such that equilibria with incom-
plete specialization exist, we also need the following: nRE sA /1][ = , [( (0.5)) ]sAE R ′  
2(1 / )y y= − −  nyy /)/1( 2−+ , and nRERRE sAsAsA /])[(2])[( ′=′ . A little algebra shows that 
])(,[ ′sAsA RRCov  ])[( sAsA RRE ′= ][])[( sAsA RERE ′− nRE sA /)( ′=  and ][ sARVar  
))/(1((/1 22 yyn += 2)/1( −+ yy  )5.0−  Now it is easy to check that ][ sARVar  < 
[ , ( ) ]s sA ACov R R ′− , and so Result 4 can be applied. After a bit of manipulation, the minimum 
level of risk disutility necessary for multiple equilibria is n=λˆ .  
For concreteness, consider the following numerical values: 10=n , 2/ =yy , 11=λ . 
Substituting these values in the optimality condition 0)( * =αriV  obtains three equilibrium 
inter-regional acreage allocations: 33.0* =α , 5.0* =α , and, by symmetry, 67.0* =α . The 
producer expected utility evaluated at these equilibria is 098.0)67.0()33.0( == riri UU  
97.0)5.0( => riU , BAr ,=  (see the corollary). Note that if the level of risk-disutility is less 
than 10ˆ =λ , the only possible equilibrium is 5.0* =α . In this case, n=> λλ ˆ  is also a 
necessary condition for the existence of equilibria with incomplete specialization (see 
Example 3). 
A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Incomplete Specialization 
A somewhat different approach to establishing conditions for the existence of equilibria 
with incomplete diversification relies on the convex cone representation of a concave utility 
function. Specifically, any utility function can be written as a linear (convex) combination of 
very simple concave functions ],min[ zw  as follows  
 ∫= )(],min[)( zdHzwwu ,  (5) 
where 0)()( ≥′′−=′ zuzH  if u  is twice differentiable. Note that Lemmas 2 and 3 imply the 
following. Condition 0)( <αAiV  for )5.0,0(∈α  guarantees the existence of an ),0( αα ∈′  
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such that )(α′AiV 0)1( =′−= αAiV , and α′  constitutes a partial specialization equilibrium. 
This is because, by Lemma 2, 0)5.0()5.0( == BiAi VV , and, by Lemma 3, )1(0)0( AiAi VV >> , 
and function )(αAiV  is continuous.  
Using the convex cone representation of the utility function, we have )]([ wuE ′  
])(1[∫ ≤= zdHE zw  where the expectation is with respect to the random wealth w . Then the 
necessary condition for 0)( <αAiV  is that there exists a wealth level z  such that 0)( >′ zH  
and ))]1()((1[
)1(
αααα −−≤+− cAisAizRR RRE sAicAi 0< . Because one of the terms in the last expression 
is an indicator function, and the strict inequality assures that cAiR)1Pr{( α− sAiRα+ }z≤ 0> , 
this inequality can be rewritten as 
 0])()1()1(|)1()([ <≤+−−−− zRRRRE sAicAicAisAi αααααα . (6) 
Condition (6) has an intuitive interpretation. First, note that, using Result 2 under Assump-
tions 1 through 3, we have 0)]1()([ >−− αα cAisAi RRE  for 5.0<α  (see note 14). And so, the 
inequality in equation (6) is solely attributed to the constraint that the aggregate crop reve-
nue, sAi
c
Ai RR αα +− )1( , is below a certain level z . In this light, inequality (6) indicates that 
the “conditional dispersion” associated with crop s  revenue is greater than that for crop c  
when the regional acreage under crop s  is small, )5.0,0(∈α . The knowledge that the 
combined generated crop revenue will not exceed a certain level implies that the expectation 
of crop s  revenue conditioned on this information falls more than does the conditional 
expectation of crop c  revenue. This is in spite of the fact that the weight of the crop s  
revenue, α , in the total farm revenue is smaller than that for crop c , αα −<< 15.0 . 
Condition (6) is necessary for the marginal utility of allocating more farm acreage to 
crop c  to be positive, even though the share of acreage under crop c  exceeds that under crop 
s  in region A. When condition (6) holds on a set of Iz∈  with a positive Lebesgue measure, 
that is, 0>∫Idz , there must exist a differentiable utility function (.)u  such that 0)( <αAiV  
for 5.0<α . Summarizing, we have the following. 
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RESULT 5. Suppose that Assumptions 1 through 3 and 5 hold. There exists a differentiable 
utility function ∫= )(],min[)( zdHzwwu  such that there are equilibria with incomplete 
specialization )5.0,0(* ∈α )1,5.0(∪  if and only if condition (6) is satisfied for Iz∈ , where 
set I  has a positive measure with respect to )(zH , that is, ∫ >I zdH 0)( . 
 
Note that Result 5 conveys little in terms of the properties of the utility function and attitudes 
toward risk; it only states the conditions for the existence of a utility function such that there 
are multiple equilibria. For example, any utility function (5) with the property that there 
exists a small number 0>γ  such that ∫ ∉Iz zdH )( γ≤∫∈Iz zdH )(/  is a viable candidate. The 
following example is instructive and highlights a more elegant approach for obtaining the 
same characterization as in Example 2. 
 
EXAMPLE 3. Consider the same environment as in Example 2 except there is no restriction on 
the utility function. Pick a sufficiently small wealth level nz /1< . Then it is easy to verify 
that the condition )1/()1)[(/1()()1()1( csAi
c
Ai ynRR ααααααα +−−=+−−  + 
/( (1 ) )syα α+ − α z≤  can only be satisfied when cy , 1>sy . Because random variables 
o
A
o
B
o yyy /=  follow a three-point distribution ( )4/1,/;2/1,1;4/1,/ yyyy , sco ,= , condition 
zyRyR ssAi
cc
Ai ≤+−− );();1()1( αααα  may only hold when the realizations of both cy  and 
sy  are high: 1}/Pr{ === yyyy sc , where 1/ >yy . In particular, it is satisfied when 
)2/())2(4(/ 2 znznznDDyy −++≥ , where ))1()(1( 22 αα −+−= znD ))1(/( αα − , 
which is always satisfied when 1≤zn . But in this case, we have cAicAisAi RRRE )1(|[ α−−  
]zRsAi ≤+α ]/|[ yyyyRRE sccAisAi ==−= )/)1(/(1)[/1( yyn αα −+= )]/1/(1 yyαα +−−  
)/1)(21)(/1( yyn −−= α )/1/[( yyαα +− 0)]/)1(( <−+ yyαα  because 5.0<α  and 
1/ >yy . And so, if there is sufficient dispersion in the yield distributions (i.e., yy /  is large) 
there always exists a utility function (possibly exhibiting a large degree of risk aversion at 
low wealth levels) such that there are equilibria with partial regional specialization. 
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Alternatively, let us fix the yield dispersion parameter, yy / , and look for the value of 
the wealth level z  such that condition (6) is satisfied. For any )/1,0( nz∈  condition (6) is 
operative because nyRyR ssAi
cc
Ai /1);();1()1( <+−− αααα  when == sc yy 1/ >yy , and 
we showed that zyyRyyR sAi
c
Ai ≤+−− )/;()/;1()1( αααα  implies that condition (6) holds. 
To construct a candidate utility function (5), consider the simplest possible measure )(zH  
zµ=  for ]/1,0[ µ≤∈z  and 1)( =zH  for µ/1>z , where 0>µ . Hence, if n/1/1 <µ  or 
n>µ  there must exist incomplete specialization equilibria with )5.0,0(* ∈α )1,5.0(∪ . 
Substituting this weighting measure in (5) and integrating over the intervals wz ≤  and wz >  
yields: 2/)( 2wwwu µ−= , where n>µ . Compare this with the finding in Example 2 that 
the level of risk disutility must be n>λ  for the equilibria with partial specialization to exist 
in the case of mean-variance preferences. 
 
Discussion 
At the farm level, the problem of acreage allocation by a risk-averse producer is the 
standard portfolio selection problem in which the total wealth (land) needs to be allocated 
among risky assets (crops). What makes the problem studied in this paper distinct is the 
nature of the endogeneity of asset returns (net crop revenues) as a result of the investment 
decisions (land allocation) made by growers. While crop revenues are taken as exogenous by 
the individual producer, they depend on the distribution of crop acreage between the two 
regions because of the spatial yield correlation structure. Because crop yields within the 
region are likely more correlated than across the regions, the degree of systematic yield risk 
is affected by the inter-regional land allocation. If each region completely specializes in one 
crop, crop outputs are possessed of a relatively high degree of systematic risk compared with 
the situation when both regions produce both crops. 
The way in which the probability distributions of crop revenues and the expected incre-
mental returns from switching crops are affected by the redistribution of crop acreages across 
regions is, in general, ambiguous. This is because a crop revenue gross of production costs is 
the product of the producer-specific yield and the price that is common to all producers. On 
the one hand, the expected revenue decreases as the individual yield becomes more corre-
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lated with the total output. This effect is operative because the individual yields in the region 
where most of the crop is produced are more correlated with the total output than are the 
individual yields in the region where most of the crop is produced elsewhere. Hence, as 
regions become more specialized in one crop, the “price-yield correlation” effect on the 
expected crop revenues is unambiguous because of the monotonicity of the price function. 
Now consider the crop revenue’s second component, the crop price that depends on the 
aggregate output. An increase in the systematic risk present in the crop output may have a 
positive or negative impact on the expected crop price depending on the curvature properties 
of the inverse demand function. This is much the same as how the effect of uncertainty on the 
expected value of a function depends on whether the function is concave or convex.16 As a 
result, the effect of the inter-regional land allocation on the expected crop revenues is sensi-
tive to the specifics of the environment under scrutiny.  
In general, the motives for the regional specialization in a small number of crops may 
stem from the non-monotone expected crop revenue differential, quite apart from the risk 
management aspects of the acreage allocation decisions. The problem is that the existence of 
multiple local optima may be due to the difficult-to-discern features of the production and 
demand environment, such as the curvature of the demand functions and the differences in 
spatial yield correlations across regions and within a region. Because inter-regional land 
allocation has overall ambiguous effects on the expected incremental return from switching 
crops, we create a specialized environment to better focus on the effects that land allocation 
has on the risks associated with crop revenues.  
To this end, the paper exploits the symmetry in growing conditions both within and across 
regions that simplifies the analysis and isolates the role of risk aversion on production deci-
sions. In this way, the number of dimensions is reduced because it is natural to focus on 
equilibria in which regions “mirror” each other in acreage allocation given the symmetry in all 
other aspects. Note that the symmetry across farms and probability distributions of crop 
revenues, conditional on the corresponding acreage allocation, eliminates any reasons for 
asymmetries in land allocation decisions stemming from the variations in production or 
marketing opportunities across farms or regions. 
This approach is also a convenient calibration device since, under any level of risk aver-
sion, the full diversification in production such that growers in each region allocate a half of 
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their acreage to each crop is equilibrium. While it is the only equilibrium under risk neutrality, 
equilibria with incomplete specialization in which growers allocate a greater share or even all 
of their acreage to one of the crops may exist under risk aversion. Because of the symmetry 
among growers across both regions, the welfare estimates are straightforward since a represen-
tative agent exists. In particular, we find that producer welfare is affected by inter-regional crop 
acreage allocation in a non-monotone manner and may be higher under incomplete specializa-
tion relative to the full diversification outcome. 
 
Conclusions 
This study inquiries into the acreage allocation decisions at farm and regional levels un-
der risk aversion, yield uncertainty, and endogenous crop prices in a two-crop, two-region 
setting. The main insight is that a partial specialization in one crop at a regional level may be 
an equilibrium dominant strategy relative to the more diversified crop mix produced on farm. 
This applies to the environments where one can identify growing regions that are possessed 
of two features. The first feature is that growing conditions are relatively homogenous and 
there is higher farm-level yield co-variability within each region as compared with that 
across the regions. The second feature is that the sizes of the regions are large enough to have 
a substantial impact on output prices. Also, complete specialization where each region grows 
only one crop is found to be impossible when yields for different crops within a region are 
uncorrelated unless there are comparative advantages in production (or marketing) across 
producers. This is because the expected revenue for the crop that is grown elsewhere will be 
rather high because of the lack of the negative price-yield correlation. 
In general, production of multiple crops on each farm leads to a less effective “natural 
hedge” and may increase the individual crop’s riskiness. This, of course, needs to be bal-
anced with the reduction of whole-farm revenue risk through crop enterprise diversification. 
Unless the disparity in expected crop revenues is small, risk-averse producers will not totally 
avoid allocating some of their land to a riskier crop. In particular, complete specialization is a 
plausible equilibrium outcome under the following conditions: a high level of risk aversion, 
limited benefits derived by crop enterprise diversification because of high correlation of 
farm-level yields for different crops, and low crop price elasticities that provide a cap on the 
gap between the expected crop revenues.   
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The analysis in this paper relies on a somewhat crude spatial yield dependence structure. 
Namely, it is held that the spatial yield correlation is invariant for all farms within a region. 
And so, the only way the “spatial” aspect of the environment is captured in the model is 
through the decline in the correlation among yields on farms in different regions relative to 
that in the same region. In reality, spatial yield correlation likely declines “slowly” as the 
distance between the land plots increases within a certain range and differs across farms in 
each region as well as across regions (Wang and Zhang 2003).17 An effort to consider this 
more realistic spatial yield dependence characterized by a continuous, and possibly heteroge-
neous, decline in correlation is left for future research. The environments with the discrete 
jump in yield dependence across regions are plausible if regions are spatially, or otherwise, 
separated. This can happen if the “distance” between the regions is significant as compared 
with the size of the regions. 
To inspect the circumstances under which (partial) regional specialization constitutes 
equilibrium, a number of factors were omitted that are controlled by producers and are 
important in any analysis of acreage allocation decisions. In particular, through the choice of 
inputs, farming methods, and pest management, producers can affect the probability distribu-
tion of farm-level yields (endogeneity of yield risk at the farm level). Also, the price is taken 
to be a deterministic function of the total supply, which assumes away any price risk stem-
ming from the demand side of the market. Furthermore, in a sense, the price and yield risks 
are treated as perfect substitutes, while production and marketing contracts, storage following 
harvest, and pre-harvest pricing are likely to provide more opportunities to “hedge” price risk 
as opposed to yield risk. Finally, the interaction of acreage allocation decisions with crop 
insurance schemes is left unattended.  
The implications of this research warrant an empirical inquiry into the extent to which risk 
management is a possible determinant of the regional acreage allocation patterns observed in 
real-world agricultural landscapes. Empirical data for estimating the appropriate model for the 
spatial yield dependence structure is likely readily available because of the recent progress 
made in the area of geographic information systems and the statistical analysis of spatial data. 
While the primary intent of this analysis is to characterize conditions for regional specializa-
tion, there is a normative implication in terms of the redistributive effects of the inter-regional 
land allocation. One could conjecture that a suitable reallocation of crop production among 
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areas that share similar growing conditions because of common soil, climate, and other envi-
ronmental characteristics may obviate or diminish the need for agricultural revenue insurance 
markets beleaguered by moral hazard and adverse selection problems. This is, of course, given 
that the standard caveats due to the wide-ranging environmental impacts of crop production on 
soil, climate, and yield productivity are taken into account.  
  
Endnotes 
1. For example, the estimates of the farm price–yield correlation for corn in the United 
States at the county level indicate that the negative correlation is more pronounced in the 
Corn Belt area than it is outside of that area (Harwood et al. 1999). 
2. Some entropy-based measures of enterprise diversification across different types of 
agricultural operations are provided in Jinkins (1992). There is a large literature analyz-
ing benefits and costs of enterprise diversification on farm operations such as soil effects 
of crop rotation, labor management during the planting time, a broader managerial ex-
pertise, and farm machinery and equipment requirements. In addition to identifying 
complementarities and substitutabilities in multiple output farming operations and a 
number of technological and marketing constraints for diversification, most of the papers 
in this area are concerned with the effect of producer heterogeneities such as farm size 
and wealth on incentives to diversify (see Pope and Prescott 1980; Beneke 1998; Dodson 
1993; Schoney, Taylor, and Hayward 1994; Held and Zink 1982; and Sonka and Patrick 
1984). Nartea and Barry (1994) inquired into the risk reduction effects of geographical 
diversification involving farming several noncontiguous locations.  
3.  Very informally, the observation that the effective negative price-yield correlation 
provides a “natural hedge” for crop revenues is probably best summarized by Neil Harl: 
“... the only thing worse for a farmer than bad weather is good weather” (quoted in 
Goodwin 2000, p. 76). And so, we are interested in the (collective) choice between the 
“natural hedge” common to all producers in a “large” region where a small number of 
crops are produced and the “individual hedge” derived through production of a plural 
number of crops on each farm.  
4.  In a related line of inquiry, Chavas (1993) and Hennessy (1997) analyze the effects of 
exogenous price uncertainty on equilibrium land allocation and the Ricardian rent. 
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5.  In a recent study, Wang and Zhang (2003) find that the positive dependence among crop 
yields varies inversely with distance in a somewhat discrete manner: it exists when the 
distance between the land plots is within a certain range but rapidly approaches zero 
when the land plots are sufficiently far apart. Using county-level data, Wang and Zhang 
estimate that the range for the positive correlation among yields for the three major U.S. 
field crops—corn, soybeans, and wheat—lies within a 570-mile radius, or even smaller. 
Nartea and Barry (1994) find a significant negative relationship between yield correla-
tion and distance for corn and soybeans in central Illinois once the distance between land 
parcels exceeds 30 miles (the geographic dispersion of fields in their study was limited 
to 125 miles).  
6. Hennessy and Lapan (2003) provide a fundamental treatment of the concept of “more 
systematic risk” and its formalizations in a broad economic setting with some applica-
tions. The supermodular stochastic order is widely used in insurance and financial 
management literatures. 
7. If function φ  is twice differentiable this is equivalent to 0/2 ≥∂∂∂ ji xxφ  for all ji ≠ . This 
property of supermodular functions will be used in proofs. 
8. Parts (b) and (c) can be jointly stated as 1 1... ...
c c s s
r rn r rn sm rF F F F F⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ≺ . Stating the 
positive dependence among the farm-level yields in each region separately in the manner 
of Assumption 1 facilitates the subsequent exposition (see part [b] of Assumptions 4 and 
5.) 
9. The assumption that yields are independent across regions (part [a] of Assumption 1) can 
be weakened to allow for the negative dependence, i.e., .sm A BF F F≺  The independence 
condition is easier to work with and does not change the qualitative nature of the results. 
10. Note that we assume that the two crops are neither substitutes nor complements in 
consumption. This assumption simplifies the subsequent analysis but should not affect 
the qualitative nature of the results unless the substitution effects are significant. 
11. Unless stated otherwise, primes denote differentiation. 
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12.  Note that under symmetry, 1=oriβ , the dependence structure used in Result 3 can be 
obtained without part (a) of Assumption 4 by assuming that 1 1( ,..., , ,..., )
c c c s
r r rn r rnF y y y y  = 
1 1 1min[ ( ),..., ( ),
c c c c
r r r rnF y F y  1 1 1( ),..., ( )]
s c s s
r r r rnF y F y  since by part (b) of Assumption 3 farms 
are symmetric, 1
o o
ri rF F=  for all i. 
13. For concreteness, we use the optimality condition for region A. The optimality condition 
for the other region is completely analogous and is implied by (3). 
14. The proof of Result 2 ascertains that the expected revenue differential in each region is 
monotone in α , and the evaluations of the differential at 0=α  and 1=α  have the op-
posite signs. 
15. Condition [ ]sAVar R [ , ( ) ]
s s
A ACov R R ′< −  implies that [ (0.5)] / 2 [ ,( ) ]s s sAi A AVar R Cov R R ′∂ ∂α =  
< 0. 
16. An increase in systemic risk implies an increase in the aggregate yield volatility because 
the yield diversification across areas is less effective. Formally, we have 
1( ... )nH y y dG+ +∫  1( ... )nH y y dG′≤ + +∫  if smG G′≺  and 0H ′′ ≥  because 
1( ... )nH y y+ +  is supermodular when H is convex (take 2( )H y y= ). 
17. Also, it is likely that the spatial yield dependence structure is affected by cropland 
allocation itself when the risks of a spreading epidemic or infestation as well as other 
environmental impacts are affected by the density of plant population.  
 
  
Appendix 
Proofs of Results and Lemmas 
 
Proof of Result 1 
Suppose to the contrary that in equilibrium 0* =Aiα  and 1* =Bkα  for all ni ,..,1=  and 
mk ,...,1= . Then the optimality conditions are ])([ sAicAiAi RRuE ′ )([ cAiAi RuE ′≤ ]cAiR  and 
])([ sBk
s
BkBk RRuE ′ )([ sBkBk RuE ′≥ ]cBkR , where cricrinj cAjccri cyyPR −= ∑ = )( 1  and sriR  
s
ri
n
j
s
Bjs yyP )( 1∑ == sric− . Consider the left-hand side of the first inequality. Differentiation 
establishes that the function ,,...,( 1
c
An
c
A yyh )
s
Ajy
s
Ai
c
AiAi RRu )(′=  is supermodular in ( sAicAj yy , ) 
for all j  if condition (i) holds. Because the yields are independent across regions by part (a) 
of Assumption 1 and are positively dependent across crops within a region by part (c) of 
Assumption 1, we have ])([ sAi
c
AiAi RRuE ′ sAimj sBjscAicAi
n
j
c
AjcAi yyPEcyyPuE )]([))](([ 11 ∑∑ == −′=  
]sAic− ][)]([ sAicAiAi RERuE ′≥ . Alternatively, the last inequality always holds under condition 
(ii). On the other hand, risk aversion ( 0<′′u ) implies that )]([])([ cAiAicAicAiAi RuERRuE ′<′  
][ cAiRE . Hence, from the optimality condition for farms in region A , we obtain that 
c
Ai
s
Ai ERER <  for all i . Similarly, the optimality condition in region B  implies that 
c
Bk
s
Bk ERER >  for all k . Because the inverse demands are decreasing functions; sBjy  and sAiy , 
and cAjy  and 
c
Biy  are pair-wise independent by part (a) of Assumption 1; }{
o
riy  are positively 
dependent by part (b) of Assumption 1; and condition (iii) holds; these last two inequalities 
are mutually exclusive. The proof in the case 1* =Aiα  and 0* =Bkα  is analogous. 
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Proof of Lemma 1 
For concreteness, take 0=Aα  and AB αα −= 1 . Differentiating =oAiER  
∑− j oAjAo yP )1(( α ∑+ j orioBjA yy )α orc−  at 0=Aα  yields =′= ]))0([( AoAiRE α  
]))(([ ∑ ∑∑ −′ j oAij oAjoBjj oAjo yyyyPE . Because, by Assumption 2, all farms in region A  are 
homogenous, we can write =′]))0([( oAiRE ∑∑′ j oBjj oAjo yyPEn )(([)/1(  )∑− j oAjy ]∑ j oAjy . 
And so, the sign of ]))0([( ′oAiRE  depends on the direction of the inequality 
∑∑∑ ∑∑ ′<≥′ j oAjj oAjoj j oAjoBjj oAjo yyPEyyyPE ]))(([)(])([ 2 . Rewrite it as follows: 
),()(),( xxEfyxEf <≥ , where ∑∑ == j oBjj oAj yyyx , , and xyxPyxf o )(),( ′= . Note that the 
sums of crop yields in regions A  and B  are independent (part [a] of Assumption 1) and are 
possessed of the same marginals. Therefore, the direction of the inequality depends on 
whether the function xyxPyxf o )(),( ′=  is supermodular or submodular: the expected value 
of a supermodular (submodular) function increases (decreases) as the dependence (in the 
sense of the supermodular stochastic dominance) increases. Differentiating twice ),( yxf  
gives the condition required in the result.  
 
Proof of Lemma 2 
We need to show that )(αAiU )1()1(( αα −−= sAiREu ))(αα cAiR+ )1( α−= AiU  
))1()()1(( αααα −+−= cBjsBj RREu )1( α−= BjU . The second equality is due to Assumption 2, 
part (a), that the crop revenues are exchangeable random variables given that the shares of 
acres allocated to crops in each region are the same. The third equality is due to Assumption 
2, part (a) and Assumption 3, part (b), that the probability distributions of yields within the 
region and across the regions are exchangeable random variables. Also, observe that )(αriV  
)1( α−−= riV , which implies that 0)5.0()5.0( == BjAi VV , and 5.0** == BA αα  is equilibrium. 
 
Proof of Result 2 
Equilibrium without specialization is given by )1([),( ** αα −= cAiREiEH )]( *αsAiR− 0=  
for all ni ,...,1= , with the similar condition for region B satisfied by symmetry. We can rewrite 
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the second term as )(αsAiER 1[ ((1 ) n ss AjjE P y== − α ∑  + 1 )) ]n s s sBj Bij y y c=α − =∑  
1
[ ((1 ) n cc AjjE P y=− α ∑ ))1∑ =+ nj cBjyα ]ccBi cy − , where part (b) of Assumption 3 is used to get 
the first equality, and part (a) of Assumption 3 is used to get the second. Substitution yields 
)])())1(([),(
11
c
Bi
c
Ai
n
j
c
Bj
n
j
c
Ajc yyyyPEiEH −+−= ∑∑ == ααα . Because all farms are homoge-
nous with identical yield probability distributions we have =′ )],([ iHE α  
]),([)/1(
1∑ = ′nj jHEn α )))1(([)/1( 11 ∑∑ == +−′−= nj cBjnj cAjc yyPEn αα 21 1( ) ]n nc cBj Ajj jy y= =−∑ ∑  > 
0. Next, evaluate the expected revenue differential ),( iEH α  at 5.0,0=α , and 1: 
))([),0(
1
c
Ai
n
j
c
Ajc yyPEiEH ∑ ==  ])( 1 cAinj cBjc yyP ∑ =− 0< , ),1( iEH  ),0( iEH−= 0> , and 
0),5.0( =iEH . Therefore, 5.0* =α  is the unique equilibrium. 
 
Proof of Result 3 
At 0* =Aiα  and 1* =Bjα , the optimality conditions are 0)0( ≤AiV  ( 0)1( ≥BiV ). Hence, 
upon using condition (i), we need to show that  
 ≤−−′ )])()()(([ sAisAsAisBscAicAcAicAcAi cynyPcynyPuE ββ  
 )])()()(([ cAi
c
A
c
Ai
c
Ac
c
Ai
c
A
c
Ai
c
AcAi cynyPcynyPuE −−′ ββ .  (A.1)  
The proof proceeds in two steps. 
Step 1. Consider the left-hand side of (A.1). Observe that by part (a) of Assumption 3, 
we have sAi
s
A
s
Ai
s
B
s cynyP −β)(Pr{ }R≤ })(Pr{ RcynyP cAicAcAicBc ≤−= β , and, hence, 
)(([ cAcAi nyPuE ′ cAcAi yβ )cAic− sAsAisBs ynyP β)(( =− )]sAic ))(([ cAicAcAicAcAi cynyPuE −′ β  
c
r
c
Ai
c
rc ynyP 21 )(( β )]cAic−  given that the dependence structure corresponding to the one among 
s
A
s
B
c
A yyy ,,  is maintained among 
c
r
c
r
c
A yyy 21 ,, . Because the “average” yield for crop c  in region 
A , cAy , and the “average” yield for crop s  in region B , 
s
By , as well as 
s
Ay  and 
s
By , are pair-
wise independent (part [a] of Assumption 1), and part (b) in Assumption 4 holds, we have 
Br =1  and Ar =2  for the identity to hold. 
Step 2. Now we show that ))(([ cAi
c
A
c
Ai
c
AcAi cynyPuE −′ β cAcAicBc ynyP β)(( )]cAic−  
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)(([ cAcAi nyPuE ′≤ cAcAi yβ )cAic− )])(( cAicAcAicAc cynyP −β . Imagine that yields cAy  and cBy  are 
comonotonic random variables. Formally, if ,Pr{ xy cA ≤ }yy cB ≤ },min[Pr{ xycA ≤=  
}]Pr{ yy cB ≤  then, instead, we must have Ar =1  and Ar =2  in the last identity, and the 
inequality (A.1) must hold as equality. Because by assumption the yields are not perfectly 
correlated across regions (in fact, the yields are independent across regions), that is, 
}Pr{},Pr{ xyyyxy cA
c
B
c
A ≤=≤≤ }Pr{ yy cB ≤ },min[Pr{ xy cAsm ≤≺ }]Pr{ yy sB ≤ , inequality in 
(A.1) holds if the function ynyPuyxf cAicAi β)((),( ′= )cAic− ))(( sAisAis cynxP −β  is supermodu-
lar. Differentiating twice ),( yxf  establishes that such a property adheres if condition (ii) is 
satisfied. The same analysis applies in region B. 
 
Proof of Lemma 3 
By definition, we have ∑∑ −′= sAisBjsccAicAjcAi yyPcyyPuEV )()()(()0( sc−  
)))(( ∑ −− ccAicAjc cyyP . Observe that ))()()(( ∑∑ −−′ ssAisBjsccAicAjc cyyPcyyPuE  
∑∑ −−′= ])([))(( ssAisBjsccAicAjc cyyPEcyyPuE ∑∑ −′≥ sBisBjsccAicAjc yyPEcyyPuE )([))((  
]sc− ∑∑ −−′= ])([)])(([ ccAicAjcccAicAjc cyyPEcyyPuE ))(([ ∑ −′≥ ccAicAjc cyyPuE ×
)])(( ∑ − ccAicAjc cyyP . The first equality is due to the yield independence for the two crops 
within each region (Assumption 5) as well as across regions (part [a] of Assumption 1). The 
first inequality is due to the inter-regional yield independence and positive intra-regional 
dependence (parts [a] and [b] of Assumption 1), and symmetry across regions (Assumption 
3, part [b]). The second equality is due to Assumption 3 that the crop revenues are exchange-
able random variables and regions are symmetric. The last inequality is due to risk aversion. 
Hence, we have 0)0( >AiV , and 0)0()1( <−= AiAi VV . 
 
Proof of Result 4 
We need to show that condition 0)5.0( >′AiV  reduces to the condition stated in the result 
when =)(αAiU ])[][)1(()1( 22 sAicAisAicAi RVarRVarERER ααλαα +−−+− , where yield inde-
pendence across different crops in a region (Assumption 5) is used to calculate the variance 
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of the whole-farm revenue. Differentiating (revenues are exogenous at the producer level) 
yields gives ][)( cAi
s
AiAi RREV −=α )1((2 αλ −+ ])[][ sAicAi RVarRVar α− . Differentiating one 
more time (now crop revenues are endogenous) yields )5.0(AiV ′  ])[((2 ′= sARE λ− ][( sARVar  
])))(,[ ′+ sAsA RRCov , where )5.0(sAisA RR = , and the independence and symmetry among the 
crop revenues was used. The condition stated in the result is meaningful only if the sign of 
])[( ′sARE  is negative. Next, we check that this is indeed the case. Note that ])[( ′sARE  
)5.0([
,∑′= jr srjs yPE )]( ∑∑ − j sBjj sAjsAi yyy )5.0([)/1( ,∑′= jr srjs yPEn  ∑∑ j sAji sAi yy (  
)]∑− j sBjy ]|),([)(/1( yxyxGEn >= )Pr( yx > ]|),([ yxyxGE <+  ))Pr( yx <  
)Pr(])|),([]|),([)(/1( yxyxxyGEyxyxGEn >>+>= , where ∑= j sAjyx , ∑= j sBjyy , 
and )())(5.0(),( yxxyxPyxG s −+′= .  Because the regions are symmetric, we have 
)Pr()Pr( yxyx <=> , and ),(),( xyGyxG −<  for yx > .  Hence, we obtain 0])[( <′sARE . 
The analysis for region B is analogous. 
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